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The following paper examines Israel's views toward future armed conflicts. It discusses four main 
themes: Israel's traditional security doctrine since the days of its establishment; the emergence of 
new threats over the last decade and their future significance; Israel's evolving response; and the 
question of what, if any, relevance this has for the United States. The main argument of this paper is 
that, while one could conceive Israel's situation as a window to the future and benefit from studying 
various aspects of its force structure and employment, one should also be very cautious in making 
comparisons to Israel's unique situation and responses.  
 
Israel's traditional security doctrine 
Israel's original security doctrine was shaped by its geostrategic position and a host of constraining 
factors, such as demographics. David Ben Gurion, the architect of Israel's security doctrine was 
mindful of the need to tailor a “unique response to a unique situation.” Ben Gurion's analysis led 
him to form the following basic assumptions:  
• Arab hostility toward the State of Israel will likely continue for decades  
• Israel suffers from chronic inferiority in both territory and demographics  
This basic asymmetry in resources, combined with Arab hostility, led him to conclude both that 
Israel cannot afford to maintain a huge army and that only a series of decisive defeats on the 
battlefield might convince Arab regimes to accommodate the notion of Israel’s permanence.  
The major threat during Ben Gurion’s years as prime minister (1955-63) was a potential invasion of 
Israel by strong conventional forces of one or more Arab armies effectively occupying and cutting 
off major centers and, thus, ending the life of the young Jewish state. In addition, these early years of 
the state of Israel saw the rise of terror attacks against settlements along Israel’s borders disrupting 
normal life.  
Under Ben Gurion's leadership, Israel's security tenets were shaped by the following principles:  
• Exhibiting conventional superiority and self-reliance on the battlefield in order to achieve a 
quick decision by quickly transferring the war into enemy territory, annihilating its main forces, 
and threatening its capital. In the absence of a big standing army, most units would be 
comprised of reservists.  
• Develop and maintain a special relationship with a superpower (initially France, later the United 
States) for the sake of diplomatic and material support. 
• Obtain technological superiority grounded in top-flight academic and research institutions in 
order to nurture a thriving industry. The concept of nuclear ambiguity appeared later.  
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• Possess moral and ideological certainty that Israel's struggle is inherently just, which is critical for 
mobilizing society to endure a long struggle.  
Ben Gurion believed that sustaining the above qualities would generate superior battlefield 
performance and secure Israel's existence.  
These security tenets were then translated into three organizing operational concepts: deterrence, early 
warning, and decision.  Deterrence was not understood as absolute deterrence, but rather as accumulative 
deterrence. It is different from the concept employed by the two superpowers during the Cold War. 
Israeli deterrence meant postponing each round of violent conflict as much as possible, but realizing 
that, since conflict is unavoidable, deterrence is inherently destined to fail at one point or another. 
When this happens, early warning capabilities will enable a quick mobilization of Israel's reserve units, 
which comprise the bulk of its ground forces. This process operates with minimal interference due 
to the Israel Air Force’ air superiority. Reserve forces that have been quickly assembled into brigades 
and divisions will then reinforce standing army units that have been both blocking an enemy 
advance on the border and maneuvering inside enemy territory for the sake of neutralizing its main 
forces. Operationally, this is achieved by employing a classic maneuver that aims to envelope or 
encircle the primary forces of the enemy. A quick and decisive outcome is critical also due to the 
deployment of reserves that are needed desperately to perform their regular civil functions. 
This approach was also characterized in US Army doctrine as a “maneuver approach,” one that 
seeks to neutralize or strike critical enemy targets and thus paralyze an opponent’s entire system. It 
emphasizes speed and the independence of commanders who are able to exploit fleeting 
opportunities on the battlefield, virtues, which the Israel Defense Force (IDF) perceives that it 
possesses as an advantage over its adversaries.2 
According to this doctrine, the outcome of every round of violence should leave no room for 
interpretation. The victorious should be undisputed and the price paid by the vanquished in prestige 
and material should be sufficiently heavy that they lose their appetite for another round in the 
foreseeable future. Ben Gurion hoped that, after a few rounds with exclusively negative outcomes 
for Israel’s adversaries, the Arabs would understand that they had reached a strategic impasse and 
thus desist. This is the thought that underlies accumulative deterrence—gathering more deterrence with 
each additional round of fighting. 
Israel's security doctrine served the country well during the first four decades of its existence. 
However, there were also some interesting deviations. For example, in both 1956 and 1967, Israel 
initiated preemptive strikes when it felt threatened, demonstrating that the interpretation of early 
warning in its doctrine was an elaborate one. In 1956, Israel went to war only after it secured the 
direct military cooperation of two European powers, Great Britain and France. In 1960, its early 
warning system failed when the Egyptian army was deployed in the Sinai during what is known as 
the Rotem Affair. Later, in 1973, the early warning system failed again, this time when enemy 
intentions were misinterpreted. Although enemy troop mobilization offered a clear signal, the Israeli 
government refused to order a preemptive strike out of fear for the political consequences and Israel 
came under a surprise attack. But, other components of its security doctrine worked magnificently 
well and enabled Israel to turn the tables in this conflict. These included American political 
assistance and shipments of military hardware, quick mobilization of reserve units, and the ability of 
IDF commanders to seize the initiative after the initial surprise and transfer the battle to enemy 
territory.  
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Paradoxically, Israel's early warning failed after territorial expansion, which followed the Six Day 
War in 1967. On the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the option of a preemptive strike was 
considered by the government, but rejected by then-Defense Minister Moshe Dayan due to the 
heavy diplomatic costs involved. The enhanced territorial buffer gave Israel a sense of security and 
allowed risk-taking that it otherwise would have avoided prior to the Six Day War. 
It can be argued that Israel's security doctrine, including the idea of accumulative deterrence, has 
been successful. Egypt, Israel's main and most dangerous rival, signed a peace treaty with Israel in 
1979, followed by Jordan in 1994. Syria has upheld the 1974 ceasefire agreements on Golan Heights 
in spite of serious tests, such as the 1982 and 2006 Lebanon Wars and other more recent operations 
reported in the media. However, the transformation of the strategic landscape during the 1990s and 
2000s has witnessed the rise of new types of adversaries, posing various new and additional threats.  
 
Israel's evolving threats 
In the past, primary threats to Israel's security would be divided into two main groups: threats posed 
by conventional militaries from bordering states to Israel's territorial integrity and threats posed by 
non-state terrorist organizations, chiefly involving disruption of daily life. However, since the 1990s, 
Israel has seen the emergence of new types of threats, which have taken a more dominant role. That 
said, Israel cannot completely exclude the risk of traditional threats—witness recent events in the 
Arab world, such as the so-called Arab Spring, particularly in Egypt. The landscape requires the 
incorporation of new threats into Israel’s pre-existing security doctrine in such a way as to provide a 
response to both old and new types of threats.  
What are these new types of threats? One categorization compartmentalizes them according to 
geography: Israel and the Palestinian territories under its control, Israel's immediate neighbors, and 
its outer circle. 
 
Israel and the Territories 
Should the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations fail or continue to languish, a disappointed Palestinian 
population could mount a popular uprising similar to the 'slingshot and stone' intifada of 1989-93. 
This scenario was already much discussed before the September 11, 2011, terrorist attacks in the 
United States and the unilateral Palestinian drive toward statehood at the UN. Palestinian terrorist 
organizations might also emerge and launch a suicide bombing campaign similar to the one of the 
2001-03 second intifada. 
 
Israel's immediate neighbors 
As mentioned above, the probability of a conventional attack by an immediate neighbor has been 
reduced dramatically during the last two decades, but should not be excluded completely. This 
assessment could change once the dust finally settles on the Arab-Spring movement that has 
engulfed Arab states, such as Syria and Egypt, and will determine the fate of these countries. 
An additional evolving threat that Israel has experienced is the rise of strong non-state actors, such 
as Hezbollah and Hamas. As masters of a territory and population, these actors combine religious 
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ideology, a political agenda, and armed struggle. They rely on the support of both local populations 
and foreign powers, such as Iran and Syria, existing almost as states within states, thus enjoying the 
advantages of statehood while not being held accountable for their actions as states are.  
Hezbollah has evolved as a prototypical champion of what some characterize as “hybrid warfare,” 
incorporating a mixture of tactics seen in guerrilla warfare, urban terror, and conventional combat 
with the objective of neutralizing Israel's operational and technological advantage. This construct has 
been described in a study published by the IDF's Dado Center as the “Other RMA” (Revolution in 
Military Affairs).3 Conceptually, it encompasses three main principles—deterrence, survivability, and 
attrition—with large quantities of cheap and easy-to-maintain concealed projectiles poised against 
Israeli population centers. These projectiles are camouflaged and defended from an Israeli ground 
incursion in tough-to-maneuver terrain and protected against Israel’s sophisticated defense systems 
that include well-trained light infantry equipped with mortars, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), 
and advanced Command and Control (C2) systems.  
This hybrid-warfare system with its offensive and defensive capabilities achieves deterrence by holding 
Israeli civilians hostage and raising the cost of mounting an operation within the enemy territory. 
Survivability is achieved through redundancy, concealment, and invisibility as IDF forces incur 
casualties while attempting to crack the defenses safeguarding the rockets that fire on Israel's 
population. In this manner, attrition is then achieved and the terrorist groups can proclaim a ceasefire 
as having resisted surrender, unlike the large Arab armies in the past. In such as conflict, the 
terrorists survive and keep firing their missiles until the end, inflicting terror and casualties on Israel. 
The conflicts in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008) exposed some of the strengths and weaknesses 
inherent to this condition. Both Hezbollah and Hamas were able to fire rockets into Israel until the 
last day of hostilities. Both suffered enormously, but survived.4 Both succeeded in manipulating the 
narrative of the conflict—in the media and public eye—to their own benefit. The lesson they 
learned seems clear: keep it up in both quantity and quality. Their goal is now to increase missile 
payloads and accuracy to the point where they cannot only terrorize Israeli civilian centers, but also 
hit strategic civilian infrastructures and military installations, thereby disrupting the IDF as it 
mobilizes its reserves and tries to function effectively. 
An interesting phenomenon of recent years has been the doctrinal convergence between 
organizations such as Hezbollah and states like Syria. Impressed by the success of the Hezbollah 
model and aware of its own limitations, the Syrian armed forces have increasingly adopted the 
Hezbollah model. The Syrian state, however, possesses a much larger and much more accurate 
missile arsenal capable of accurately striking on critical assets in Israel. At the same time, Syria is also 
a state and thus does not enjoy the same immunity as Hezbollah. 
 
Israel's Outer Circle 
During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq fired 39 Scud missiles at Israel, marking a new era in Israel security. 
Previously Iraq and other countries lacking a mutual border with Israel had dispatched ground 
forces as reinforcements to help their Arab neighbors fight Israel. Such was the case in both 1948 
and 1973. The introduction of ballistic missiles later provided the means to hit Israel from afar. 
Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the neutralization of its strategic capabilities, Iran has taken the 
lead in developing long-range ballistic missile capabilities. Syria also possesses a large arsenal of these 
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missiles. It would take 60 seconds for a Syrian Scud and 10 minutes for the same missile launched 
from Iran to strike Tel Aviv. 
New missile capabilities by those in Israel’s Outer Circle are now being coupled with an increased 
WMD potential and enhanced nuclear program. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was suspected of pursuing 
this course and thus was invaded by a US-led coalition. At present Iran remains undeterred, 
continuing its own nuclear program.  
 
The Rival System: Creating synergy 
Another way to view these emerging threats is to conceptualize the various hostile entities as one 
system with different components that reinforce each other and create a synergetic effect. Hezbollah 
and Hamas are proxies of Iran and Syria; all these actors are dependent on each other, playing 
different roles and utilizing their relative advantage. Hezbollah and Hamas are well trained and 
benefit from access to state-of-the-art weapons, deep bunkers, ATGMs, and C2 systems precisely 
because they are supported, equipped, and trained by states. Without state support, these 
organizations would not pose the same threat level to Israel. It is the merger between states and 
non-state organizations that generates such a wide spectrum of threats: WMD, standoff fire, suicide 
bombings, international terror, guerilla insurgencies, and conventional warfare.  
 
Israel's doctrinal response  
Israeli defense planners have taken note of this changing landscape and have been working to 
update Israel’s defense thinking over the past decade. Some of Israel’s defense tenets will remain the 
same, others will be reinforced, and others are destined for change.  
In Israel, unlike in Europe or even the US, the defense budget is likely to grow over the next few 
years. Fortunately, the Israeli economy has remained robust and has experienced steady growth, 
despite the current global economic turmoil that began in 2008, thus allowing a budget increase 
without applying unbearable strain to the economy.  
Israel will continue to rely on the US as its major ally, with increase dependence on collaboration in 
the field of military technology (e.g., future JSF F-35 procurements) and the need for critical US 
support in the international arena. Moreover, in contending with an adversary as large and distant as 
Iran, Israel continues to invest in long-range capabilities, such as submarines, space technologies, the 
Joint Strike Fighter, and enhanced Special Forces capabilities. Despite these enhanced capabilities, 
Israel understands it still requires the assistance of a super power in some areas. For example, US 
radar systems deployed in Israel are designed to detect incoming ballistic missiles from a distance of 
2,000 km and allow Israel's missile defense systems additional critical response time. 
Israel will continue to depend upon its technological edge to develop new technological solutions for at 
least some of its main security challenges. This was demonstrated after the 2006 war, when Israel 
built both the Trophy system to counter ATGMs and Iron Dome to intercept short-range rockets. 
Both systems have already proven themselves operationally.  
In terms of force, design versatility is key. Facing a large spectrum of threats, Israeli force planners 
prefer those means which can operate in numerous different scenarios and be optimized, even if not 
ideally, in both counterterrorism and conventional battlefield situations. For example, the IDF only 
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employs main battle tanks (MBT) that are most suited to conventional engagements, but also 
employs these tanks in counterterrorism and guerrilla warfare scenarios.  
Changes and modifications have been made in the deterrence–early warning–decision concept. Deterrence 
has become a key tenet. In some scenarios, it is unclear whether a decisive victory can be achieved; 
when fighting against hybrid organizations, the goal is to hit them hard and as quickly as possible. At 
the same time, the Israeli home front will be exposed to a barrage of missiles and rockets, giving rise 
to another key concept: defense.  
The doctrine speaks of two types of defense: active and passive. Active defense includes multiple 
layers of anti-missile defense systems, like the Arrow (against long-range missiles), David’s Sling 
(mid-range), and Iron Dome (short-range rockets and missiles). However, these are expensive and 
can provide protection to only critical installations, ensuring that the state and the military can 
continue functioning. In parallel, the doctrine calls for investments in passive defense, building 
installations to protect the population but also educating them how to behave in such scenarios. 
This requires enhanced cooperation between Israel’s various organizations and agencies, including 
local municipalities, police, and ministries responsible for and during crisis situations.  
Israel also invests heavily in its conventional forces. The Merkava 4 and the Namer, a heavily 
protected armored personnel carrier based on the Merkava chassis, are both equipped with the 
Trophy system and are designed to enable the IDF to conduct combined arms operations—fire and 
maneuver—in order to penetrate even the most fortified lines as on the Syrian front. No less 
important, the IDF is conducting additional training and maintaining high force readiness. The IDF 
is still comprised of conscripts and reserves with a professional officer corps, but, due to growing 
technological and professional requirements, an increased number of positions are filled by career 
soldiers.  
 
What are the relevant take-aways? 
Of the four scenarios presented in the workshop materials, the only one capable of genuinely 
enhancing Israel’s security by reducing the spectrum of threats is the concert of powers. The major 
source of instability in the region is Iran. If the leading world power were to contain the Iranian 
regime through effective sanctions and a credible military threat, the current radical regime could 
collapse, possibly destabilizing all radical elements in the region. This, in turn, might facilitate the 
resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and pave the way for a possible Israeli-Palestinian 
agreement. The other three scenarios offer no real potential for increased pressure on the Iranian 
regime. As such, one can surmise that the security trends described above are likely to continue.  
Strategically, Israel's prevailing security doctrine is designed for deterrence. Israel may be the only 
country in the world, with the possible exception of South Korea, facing an imminent threat on its 
borders from strong militaries and a parallel missile threat to its main population centers. In 
contrast, at least for now, the US is focused on nation-building abroad and, thus, mobilizing forces 
and engaging in activities that are mostly counterinsurgency and population-centric in nature. For 
the IDF, civilians in battlefield areas are essentially a "nuisance," interfering with pursuit of the 
enemy. In contrast, for US forces, winning the hearts and minds of the people is the current 
mission. These conflicting goals engender a host of other differences in force composition, tactics, 
and operations.  
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Yet, there are a number of similarities as well. Both militaries fight regularly in urban areas where the 
enemy hides among the civilian population. Both lock horns with various radical Islamist groups 
that advocate deep hatred for the West and its belief system. Some tactical challenges are common 
to Israel and the US as well, including threats posed by improvised explosive devices, rocket-
propelled grenades, mortars, other small arms, and suicide bombers. 
Notwithstanding, in 2006, and to a lesser degree in 2008, the IDF confronted a much more 
sophisticated opponent than that which the US has faced in both Afghanistan and Iraq.5 Given this 
state of affairs the IDF resolved to restore and improve its conventional combined arms fighting 
abilities, having concluded that its infantry and armored units require greater firepower and 
protection for the task of maintaining mobility on the battlefield. If Iran now equips US adversaries 
with some of the same capabilities as Hezbollah, or if in the near future the US military is tasked to 
conduct deterrent/punitive expeditions that involve ground forces rather than the current focus on 
counterinsurgency and nation-building, it is advisable to carefully study the lessons learned by Israel 
in 2006 and 2008 and adjust accordingly. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
1 I wish to thank Shalom Lipner for his comments on earlier versions of this paper.  
2 See the chapter on the IDF tradition of command in Eitan Shamir, “Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission 
Command in the US, UK and Israeli Armies,” (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2011). 
3 The Study can be found in: BG Itai Brun, 'While You Were Busy Making Other Plans: "The Other RMA," Journal of 
Strategic Studies, 33:4, 2010, 535-565.  
4 See: Martin van Creveld, “The Second Lebanon War: A Re-assessment,“ Infinity Journal 3 (Summer 2011), 4–7. 
5 See the paper by David Johnson (RAND) on Israel's war against Hezbollah and Hamas.  
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